IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE

February 11, 2008 Session

JEANETTE SCOGGIN v. GUY SCOGGIN

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Knox County No. 159655-3 Michael W. Moyers, Chancellor

No. E2007-00579-COA-R3-CV - FILED FEBRUARY 21, 2008

Jeanette Scoggin ("Wife") filed for divorce from Guy Scoggin ("Husband") following a marriage of four years. The parties agreed on how to equitably divide the marital property, with the exception of Husband's interest in a limited partnership. The Trial Court divided Husband's interest in the limited partnership by awarding Wife a 50% interest in any distribution of income or proceeds from a sale. Wife appeals and is proceeding *pro se*. Wife appears to claim that she should have been given an interest in other business ventures of Husband. Wife also claims her attorney failed to have certain documents admitted at trial. We affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed; Case Remanded

D. MICHAEL SWINEY, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which HERSCHEL P. FRANKS, P.J., and SHARON G. LEE, J., joined.

Jeanette Scoggin, pro se Appellant.

Richard A. Sedgley, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the Appellee, Guy Scoggin.

MEMORANDUM OPINION¹

This is an appeal in a divorce case. The parties were married a little over four years when a complaint for divorce was filed by Wife. Following a trial, the Trial Court entered a final judgment awarding Wife a divorce and requiring Husband to pay Wife rehabilitative alimony in the amount of \$1,200 per month for 36 months. Following entry of the final decree, Wife's lawyer withdrew from her representation and Wife now is proceeding *pro se*.

In her brief on appeal, Wife appears to challenge the Trial Court's determination with regard to whether she has an interest in one of more of Husband's business ventures. Wife cites to no applicable authority at all, much less any authority supporting her position asserted on appeal. Wife fails to explain how the Trial Court's division of marital property was inequitable, even assuming that these business ventures were marital property.

In the Trial Court's final order, the Trial Court stated that the parties had equitably divided their marital property with the exception of a limited partnership interest. However, the Trial Court then ordered that Wife "shall have a security interest in [Husband's] partnership interest in CG Partners, LP to the extent of fifty percent (50%) of any distributions of income, proceeds from a sale or loan refinance distribution." Wife fails to explain how the Trial Court's distribution of this asset was inequitable. To the extent Wife is referring to an entity or entities other than CG Partners, LP, she does not explain how the Trial Court actually committed any reversible error with regard to those other entities. Wife's argument on this issue is as follows:

Appellant will address with the Court of Appeals her vested right to half (1/2) of all business profits from CG Partners, L.P., as well as anything else acquired during the relationship with Defendant....

This "argument" is altogether insufficient. Based on Wife's brief, we are unable to conclude that the Trial Court committed any reversible error. Wife fails to point us to anywhere in the record showing any specific alleged error by the Trial Court.

Wife's second issue appears to challenge her attorney's alleged failure to have certain documents and testimony admitted at trial. This appeal is not the proper forum to resolve that issue inasmuch as such a claim does not pertain to whether the Trial Court committed any reversible error.

¹ Rule 10 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals provides: "This Court, with the concurrence of all judges participating in the case, may affirm, reverse or modify the actions of the trial court by memorandum opinion when a formal opinion would have no precedential value. When a case is decided by memorandum opinion it shall be designated 'MEMORANDUM OPINION,' shall not be published, and shall not be cited or relied on for any reason in any unrelated case."

After the Trial Court entered its judgment, Husband requested and was granted a stay which had the effect of staying Husband's alimony payments to Wife. Once this opinion is mandated, the stay entered by the Trial Court is to be a nullity.

Conclusion

The judgment of the Trial Court is affirmed, and this cause is remanded to the Trial
Court for collection of the costs below. Once this opinion is mandated, the stay entered by the Trial
Court is to be a nullity. Costs on appeal are taxed to the Appellant, Jeanette Scoggin, and her surety,
if any.

D. MICHAEL SWINEY, JUDGE